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Abstract—This paper presents the chief security officer
(CSO) problem, defines its scope, and investigates several
important research questions related within the scope.
The CSO problem is defined based on the concept of
secrecy capacity of wireless communication channels. It
is also related to the chief Estimation/Executive Officer
(CEO) problem that has been well studied in information
theory. The CSO problem consists of a CSO, several agents
capable of having two-way communication with the CSO,
and a group of eavesdroppers. There are two scenarios in
the CSO problem; one in which agents are not allowed to
cooperate with one another and the other in which agents
are allowed to cooperate with one another. While there are
several research questions relevant to the CSO problem,
this paper focusses on the following and provides answers:
(1) How much information can be exchanged back and
forth between the CSO and the agents without leaking
any information to the eavesdroppers? (2) What is the
power allocation strategy that the CSO needs to follow so
as to maximize the secrecy capacity? (3) How can agents
cooperate with one another in order to increase the overall
secrecy capacity?.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Chief Security Officer (CSO) problem con-
sists of a CSO, several agents capable of having
two-way communication with the CSO, and a group
of eavesdroppers 1[12]. The objective is to estimate
the secrecy capacity of the CSO channel which
refers to the maximum achievable rate of infor-
mation transfer between the CSO and the agents
without leaking any of the information to the eaves-
dropper.
The CSO problem is mainly based on the secrecy
capacity of wireless communication channels that
has been investigated over the past several years
1The problem was originally presented in a 45th Annual Confer-
ence on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS), 2011.
[21], [8], [9], [3], [6], [1], [11]. In a standard Alice-
Bob-Eve model, secrecy capacity is defined as the
maximum amount of information that Alice can
convey to Bob while keeping it secret from Eve,
the eavesdropper. Secrecy capacities of different
types of wireless channels including noisy, fading,
and multiple input and multiple output (MIMO)
channels have been investigated over the past few
years [7], [13], [18], [10], [14], [19].
The CSO problem is also related to the Chief
Estimation/Executive Officer (CEO) problem [2]
which seeks to find tradeoffs between the sum
rate of information transfer and the total distortion
between the true and estimated values of the source.
In the CEO problem, the source is represented as a
random vector, the observations are assumed to be
noisy, and the communication channels between the
agents and the CEO are assumed to be noise-free.
The CEO receives observations from a number of
agents. An important aspect of the CEO problem
is that the agents are not allowed to communicate
among themselves. The CEO problem has been
used to model information and decision fusion con-
cepts in sensor networks (see for example, [17]).
Characterization of rate-distortion region in dis-
tributed source coding has been investigated through
CEO problem and its variants such as the multi-
terminal source coding [15], [16]. Specific cases
within multi-terminal source coding, for example,
the quadratic Gaussian multi-terminal source coding
[20]) have also been investigated in the literature.
The CEO problem is related to source coding,
whereas, the CSO problem is related to channel
coding. The CEO problem is discussed here only
to bring out duality characteristics that typically
exist between source coding and channel coding.
Given that the CEO problem has been investigated
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2in the literature over two decades, its analysis helps
us gain insights into the CSO problem. Similarly,
the new results that are discussed in our work
may provide new insights into the CEO problem.
Detailed analysis of these duality characteristics is
beyond the scope of this paper and will be reported
in our future work.
A. The CSO Problem
The CSO problem consists of a CSO, a group of
N agents working for the CSO gathering informa-
tion, and another group of M eavesdroppers capable
of listening to all conversations as shown in Fig. 1.
One can consider two scenarios: In the first scenario,
the agents are not allowed to communicate with
one another. In the second scenario, the agents are
allowed to communicate with one another.
The CSO problem includes two types of channels:
the downlink broadcast channel (BC), from CSO to
agents, as shown in Fig. 3, and the uplink multiple
access channel (MAC), from agents to CSO, as
shown in Fig. 4. In both channels, the messages are
denoted by W = W[1,N ], the input codewords de-
noted by X = X[1,N ] and the output of the channel
is denoted by Y = Y[1,N ]. The information collected
by the eavesdroppers is denoted by Z = Z[1,N ].
Subscripts [1 . . . , N ] are used to represent the users
and superscripts [1, . . . , n] are used to represent
the number of symbols transmitted or number of
times the channel is used. This common notation is
followed for both channels to bring out the duality
between them.
We consider security under information theory
paradigm and define secrecy capacity of a channel in
terms of the channel transition probability, probabil-
ity of error at the legitimate receiver, and the equivo-
cation rate for the eavesdropper [5], [11]. Extending
the concept of perfect secrecy as discussed in [11],
we consider perfect secrecy when the eavesdropper
does not obtain any information about the messages
transmitted on the legitimate channel. This happens
when the equivocation rate for the eavesdropper is
as much as the maximum rate of transmission on
the legitimate channel.
1) Downlink Broadcast Channel: Following the
notation used in [5], the CSO downlink BC channel
consists of an input alphabet X , N output alphabets
Y1,Y2, . . . ,YN and a probability transition function
defined in Eq. (1). The downlink BC channel can
be viewed as a set of parallel independent Alice-
Bob-Eve secrecy channels, one of which is shown
in Fig. 2. In each of these parallel channels, Alice,
the CSO, sends Xn, a sequence of n symbols, to
Bob, the agent. Bob receives a noisy version Y n of
Xn, while Eve, the eavesdropper, receives another
noisy version Zn.
The CSO transmits Xn to multiple agents on the
BC channel. Fig. 3 illustrates the CSO downlink
BC channel with two agents. Each agent receives
a noisy version of Xn, which is Y ni , i = 1, 2. The
agents transmit their information, Xni , i = 1, 2, to
the CSO, on the uplink MAC, as shown in Fig. 4.
In both cases, multiple Eves (eavesdroppers) listen
on all channels between the CSO and the agents.
The channels are assumed to be independent
of each other such that the transition probability
distribution function (PDF) of the CSO downlink
BC channel is:
p(y[1,N ], z[1,N ]|x) =
N∏
i=1
p(yi, zi|x), (1)
where xi ∈ Xi, yi ∈ Yi, zi ∈ Zi, i = 1, . . . , N , and
Xi, Yi, Zi represent the alphabet.
Similarly, the PDF of CSO uplink MAC channel is:
p(y, z[1,N ]|x[1,N ]) =
N∏
i=1
p(y, zi|xi), (2)
Both BC and MAC channels in the CSO problem
are assumed to be memoryless, i.e.,
BC : p(yn[1,2,...,N ], z
n
[1,2,...,N ]|xn) = (3)∏n
j=1 p(y
j
[1,2,...,N ], z
j
[1,2,...,N ]|xj),
MAC : p(yn, zn[1,2,...,N ]|xn[1,...,N ]) = (4)∏n
j=1 p(y
j, zj[1,2,...,N ]|xj[1,2,...,N ]),
where n represents the number of times the channel
is used and j ∈ (1, . . . , n) represents a particular
instance of usage.
A ((2nR1 , 2nR2 , . . . , 2nRN ), n) code for CSO BC
channel with independent information consists of an
encoder f defined by xn : 2nR1×2nR2× . . . 2nRN →
X n and N decoders φi, i ∈ (1, 2, . . . , N) defined
by Wˆ1 : Yn1 → 2nR1 , Wˆ2 : Yn2 → 2nR2 , . . .,
WˆN : YnN → 2nRN . The probability of error P (n)e
is defined to be the probability of the decoded
message not equal to the transmitted message, i.e.,
P (n)e = P (Wˆ1(Y
n
1 ) 6= W1 or Wˆ2(Y n2 ) 6= W2 or
. . ., WˆN(Y nN ) 6= WN), where the messages (W1,
3W2, . . ., WN ) are assumed to be distributed over
2nR1 × 2nR2 × . . . 2nRN .
Definition 1. The CSO downlink BC channel is said
to achieve secrecy rate R =
∑N
i=1Ri if there exists
a sequence of ((2nR1 , 2nR2 , . . . , 2nRN ), n) codes for
the (1, N) encoder-decoders set with probability
of error P (n)e and the equivocation rate for the
eavesdropper limn→∞ 1nH(Wi|Zn[1,N ]) ≥ Re ≥ Ri,
for all i ∈ [1,N].
The CSO uplink MAC channel consists of N
input alphabets X1,X2, . . . ,XN , one output alphabet
Y , and a probability transition function defined
in Eq. (2). A ((2nR1 , 2nR2 , . . . , 2nRN ), n) code for
CSO MAC channel with independent information
consists of N encoders fi, i ∈ (1, 2, . . . , N) defined
by xn1 : 2
nR1 → X n1 , xn2 : 2nR2 → X n2 , . . .,
xnN : 2
nRN → X nN , and a decoder φ defined by
yn : 2nR1×2nR2×. . . 2nRN → Yn. The probability of
error P (n)e is defined to be the probability of the de-
coded message not equal to the transmitted message,
i.e., P (n)e = P (Wˆ1(X
n) 6= W1 or Wˆ2(Xn) 6= W2 or
. . ., WˆN(Xn) 6= WN), where the messages (W1,
W2, . . ., WN ) are assumed to be distributed over
2nR1 × 2nR2 × . . . 2nRN .
Definition 2. The CSO uplink MAC channel is said
to achieve secrecy rate R =
∑N
i=1Ri if there exists
a sequence of ((2nR1 , 2nR2 , . . . , 2nRN ), n) codes for
the (N, 1) encoders-decoder set with probability
of error P (n)e and the equivocation rate for the
eavesdropper limn→∞ 1nH(Wi|Zn[1,N ]) ≥ Re ≥ Ri,
for all i ∈ [1,N].
Since the scope of this paper is limited to mem-
oryless and independent channels, from here on-
wards, we remove the superscript j =∈ 1, . . . , n,
and use Eqs (1) and (2) to describe the downlink
and uplink CSO channels respectively. We consider,
however, both correlated and uncorrelated messages
in the CSO system. The analysis begins with the
scenario in which the messages W[1,N ] transmitted
over the channels are assumed to be uncorrelated
and it is extended to include correlated messages.
B. Real World Scenarios
We discuss two real world scenarios that motivate
us design the CSO channel model, identify effective
ways to achieve its capacity, and gain insights into
the model.
Battlefield Communications: Consider a group of
soldiers gathering information about a target. Each
soldier conveys the information he or she gathers
to the CSO. In turn, the CSO communicates the
actions that need to be taken by each of the soldiers.
Two scenarios arise depending on whether peer to
peer communication among the soldiers is allowed
or not. If peer to peer communication is not allowed,
soldiers communicate only with the CSO. If peer to
peer communication is allowed, soldiers form an ad
hoc network, use cooperative strategies to commu-
nicate with the CSO. Cooperative communication
strategies enhance secrecy capacity of the network.
Drug Dealer’s Cocktail Party: Consider a cocktail
party (similar to the one described in [5]), that is
hosted by a drug dealer. Assume that a group of
agents join this party disguising as guests, operate
covertly, gather information, and pass it to the CSO.
As in the previous example, the network structure
created by agents and the CSO varies depending
on whether agents are allowed to cooperate among
themselves or not. If cooperation among the agents
is allowed, the secrecy capacity of the network
will be higher compared to the scenario in which
cooperation is not permitted.
C. Common Objectives
The CSO problem abstracts the underlying con-
cept in both scenarios described above. The objec-
tive in each scenario is to pass information along
to the CSO without eavesdropper’s knowledge. The
downlink channel from the CSO to the agents
is also as important as the uplink channel. The
two scenarios showcase the possible variations in
covert communications in terms of the participants’
awareness of the presence of the team members,
and possibilities of collaboration among them. They
demonstrate the need for efficient resource alloca-
tion strategies that maximize the information ex-
changed. They also demonstrate the constraints on
covert communications. For example, observation
of mere presence of an agent may undermine the
overall objective of the mission, and nullify the
value of information gained thus far. Real world
applications of these fundamental research problems
include secret communications in wireless networks,
cellular networks, and sensor networks.
4D. Central Issues
There are several interesting research questions
that come up in the CSO framework. We begin the
discussion with a set of simple questions related
to covert communications between the CSO and
the agents: 1) How much information the CSO
can secretly convey to any one of the agents? 2)
How much information does any one of the agents
can pass along to the CSO secretly? 3) What is
the sum of information that the CSO can secretly
convey to all the agents and 4) What is the sum
of information that all agents can collectively and
secretly convey to the CSO ? 5) What is the optimal
power allocation strategy that achieves the secrecy
capacity? 6) How can agents cooperate with one
another to increase the secrecy capacity?
E. Main Contributions
Our main contribution is the introduction of the
CSO problem and derivation of expressions for the
secrecy capacity of CSO broadcast and MAC chan-
nels with uncorrelated and correlated messages. Fur-
ther, we bring out the duality between the secrecy
capacities of CSO broadcast and MAC channels.
We discuss the power allocation strategy for the
CSO broadcast channel with independent AWGN
and fading channels based on the results presented
in [10]. In each scenario, we identify applicable ex-
isting results in the literature and relate to the CSO
problem. We demonstrate that cooperation increases
the secrecy capacity of the CSO BC channel. Using
a new metric secrecy efficiency, we demonstrate that
as much as 50% improvement in secrecy efficiency
can be achieved through the cooperation among the
agents. We provide a proof of optimality for the
proposed cooperation strategy.
F. Organization
In section II, results for the CSO problem without
cooperation among agents are presented. In section
III, a cooperation strategy is presented and results
for the CSO problem with cooperation are pre-
sented. Section IV provides summary and conclu-
sions. Proof of optimality for the proposed cooper-
ation strategy is presented in appendix A.
II. A GENERAL MODEL FOR THE CSO PROBLEM
In this section, we develop information theoretic
results for the secrecy capacity of CSO BC and
MAC channels. We begin with the BC channel
and discuss the scenario in which the transmitted
messages W[1,...,N ] on the BC channel are inde-
pendent and summarize our results in Lemmas 1
and 2. Then, the scenario in which the transmitted
messages are correlated is discussed in Lemmas
3 and 4. Next, the CSO MAC with correlated
messages is discussed in Lemmas 5 and 6. Lemma
7 briefly discusses the duality between MAC and
BC. Detailed discussion on the duality aspects in
CSO problem is outside of the scope of this paper.
Lemmas 8 and 9 discuss the secrecy capacities
of the BC channel with additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) and Rayleigh fading respectively.
Theorems 1 and 2 discuss the power allocation
strategies.
Lemma 1. The secrecy capacity (C(i,down)s ) of the
downlink channel between the CSO and ith agent
is given by C(i,down)s = max
Ui→Xi→YiZi
[I(Ui;Yi) −
I(Ui;Zi)].
The auxiliary random variable Ui correspond-
ing to channel i will serve as the cloud center
distinguishable by both the legitimate receiver as
well as the eavesdropper. We refer the reader to
[4] for an excellent discussion on the auxiliary
variable. We use the symbol U to refer to the set of
auxiliary variables (U1, U2, . . ., UN ) corresponding
to channels (1, 2, . . ., N).
Proof: This lemma follows from the basic
definition of a wiretap channel [9]. The presence
of other channels will not change this result as long
as the inputs to each of the channels are independent
of each other.
Lemma 2. The sum capacity (C(sum,down)s ) of the
CSO downlink broadcast channel consisting of N
parallel channels is given by
C(sum,down)s =
N∑
i=1
C(i,down)s (5)
=
N∑
i=1
max
Ui→Xi→YiZi
[I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Zi)].
Proof: This lemma follows from the results of
secrecy of parallel channels [11]. Here, as in Lemma
1, it is assumed that each channel i represents a
point to point communication link between the CSO
and ith agent.
5Lemmas 1 and 2 are valid for the scenario
in which the transmitted messages W[1,N ] on the
channels are uncorrelated. When the transmitted
messages are correlated, both the CSO and the
eavesdroppers benefit from the aggregation of in-
puts received from all agents. Of course, agents
also benefit from aggregation provided that they
are allowed to communicate among themselves.
However, to begin with, we assume that agents do
not communicate among themselves and derive the
following results.
Lemma 3. When Wi’s are correlated, the secrecy
capacity of the downlink channel between the CSO
and any agent i denoted by C(i,down)s is a function of
the number of agents (i.e., channels) and is given by
C(i,down)s = max
Ui→Xi→YiZi
[I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Z[1,...,N ])].
Proof: Each time an agent sends information
on a channel, the eavesdropper(s) benefits from ag-
gregating the information they acquires by tapping
all channels. Agents lose this advantage if they are
not allowed to communicate among themselves.
C(i,down)s = max
Ui→Xi→YiZi
[I(Ui;Yi) (6)
− I(Ui;Zi|Z[1,..,i−1,i+1,..,N ])]
= max
Ui→Xi→YiZi
[I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Z[1,...,N ])]
= max
Ui→Xi→YiZi
[I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Z)]
As the number of agents increases, the secrecy
capacity of the downlink channel between the CSO
and any agent i may diminish due to the advantage
eavesdroppers have over the agents.
Lemma 4. When Wi’s are correlated, the sum
secrecy capacity of the downlink channels between
the CSO and the agents, denoted by C(sum,down)s , is
bounded above by
C(sum,down)s ≤ max
U→X→Y Z
[I(U ;Y )− (7)
I(U ;Z)].
Proof: The eavesdroppers benefit even more by
aggregating the information leaked from all down-
link channels which leads to the following result:
C(sum,down)s =
N∑
i=1
C(i,down)s (8)
=
N∑
i=1
max
Ui→Xi→YiZi
[I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Z[1,...,N ])]
≤ max
Ui→Xi→YiZi
[
N∑
i=1
I(Ui;Yi)−
N∑
i=1
I(Ui;Z[1,...,N ])]
≤ max
U→X→Y Z
[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)]
We move on to the CSO uplink MAC channel.
The following two Lemmas discuss the secrecy
capacity corresponding to the CSO uplink MAC
channels.
Lemma 5. When Wi’s are correlated, the secrecy
capacity of the uplink channel between any agent i
and the CSO denoted by C(i,up)s is a function of the
number of agents (i.e., channels) and is given by:
C(i,up)s = max
Ui→Xi→YiZi
[I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Z[1,...,N ])].
Proof: Each time an agent sends information
on a channel, the CSO makes use of the information
that has been received from all other agents as side
information. On the same token, the eavesdropper
also benefits from aggregating the information it
acquires by tapping all channels.
C(i,up)s = max
Ui→Xi→YiZi
[I(Ui; |Y[1,..,i−1,i+1,..,N ]) (9)
− I(Ui;Zi|Z[1,..,i−1,i+1,..,N ])]
= max
Ui→Xi→YiZi
[I(Ui;Y[1,...,N ])− I(Ui;Z[1,...,N ])]
= max
Ui→Xi→YiZi
[I(Ui;Y )− I(Ui;Z)]
As the number of agents increases, the secrecy
capacity of the uplink between the agent and the
CSO may increase.
Lemma 6. When Wi’s are correlated, the sum
secrecy capacity of the uplink channels between the
agents and the CSO, denoted by C(sum,up)s , is bonded
from above by
C(sum,up)s ≤ max
U→X→Y Z
[I(U ;Y )− (10)
I(U ;Z)].
Proof: Similar to the scenario discussed in
Lemma 4, the CSO as well as the eavesdroppers
6benefit by aggregating the information leaked from
all uplink channels which leads to the following
result:
C(sum,up)s =
N∑
i=1
C(i,up)s (11)
=
N∑
i=1
max
Ui→Xi→YiZi
[I(Ui;Yi)− I(Ui;Z[1,...,N ])]
≤ max
Ui→Xi→YiZi
[
N∑
i=1
I(Ui;Yi)−
N∑
i=1
I(Ui;Z[1,...,N ])]
≤ max
U→X→Y Z
[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)]
A. Duality between CSO uplink and downlink chan-
nels
Lemma 7. The sum secrecy capacities of CSO
downlink BC channel and uplink MAC are equiv-
alent.
Proof: Lemma 4 and Lemma 6 demonstrate the
equivalence between the sum secrecy capacities of
the CSO uplink and downlink channels.
We conjecture that if agents are allowed to co-
operate among themselves, there exists a perfect
duality between the secrecy capacities of CSO up-
link and downlink channels. Detailed study of this
duality is outside the scope of this paper and will
be considered in future.
B. CSO Problem with Parallel Gaussian channels
Assume that all channels are additive white Gaus-
sian noise (AWGN) channels as depicted in Fig. 5.
In this case, the AWGN channel between the CSO
and any one of the agent i can be described as
Yi = Xi +NMi (12)
where Xi and Yi are the input and the output of the
ith channel and NMi represents the zero-mean white
Gaussian noise, i.e. NMi ∼N (0, σ2NMi), on the same
channel. Similarly, the eavesdropper’s channel can
be modelled as
Zi = Xi +NWi (13)
where Zi represents the output of the eavesdrop-
per’s channel and NWi denotes zero-mean white
Gaussian noise, i.e. NWi ∼ N (0, σ2NWi), on the
eavesdropper’s channel. We assume that the model
has a constraint on average power (P ) which an be
described by
1
2
N∑
i=1
x2i ≤ P. (14)
Lemma 8. In the CSO model with parallel
Gaussian channels, the sum secrecy capacity
C(sum,down,G)s of the downlink BC channel between
the agents and the CSO has an upper bound given
by:
C(sum,down,G)s ≤
N∑
i
1
2
log(1+
Pi
σ2NMi
)−
N∑
i
1
2
log(1+
Pi
σ2NWi
).
(15)
Proof: This result is obtained by substituting
capacity of parallel Gaussian channels in (5) [11].
Next, we look into the power allocation strategies
for the CSO model with parallel AWGN downlink
channels. Power allocation for parallel secrecy chan-
nels with Gaussian noise has been investigated in
[10]. The following theorem relates this to the CSO
downlink channel and provides further insights.
Theorem 1. The power allocation strategy that
achieves the sum secrecy capacity C(sum,down,G)s is a
function of both the sum of variances σ2NMi + σ
2
NWi
and difference of variances σ2NMi − σ2NWi and it
satisfies the following two constraints [10]:
Pi > 0, if σ
2
NWi
> σ2NMi (16)
= 0, otherwise(
1
σ2NMi
− 1
σ2NWi
)
> 2λ
where λ is chosen such that∑
i
[
λ− (σ2NWi − σ2NMi)
]+
= P .
Proof:
We begin with the expression for the sum capac-
ity of the channels between the agents and the CSO.
Maximization of the sum capacity subject to the
constraint on the total power can be solved using La-
grange multiplier method. Writing the Lagrangian
functional (J) as
7J(P1, . . . , PN) =
N∑
i=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
Pi
σ2NWi
)
(17)
−
N∑
i=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
Pi
σ2NMi
)
+ λ(P −
N∑
i=1
Pi)
Differentiating this functional w.r.t. Pi, setting the
resultant expression equal to zero, and manipulating
the equation, we get
(Pi+ σ
2
NMi
)(Pi+ σ
2
NWi
) =
(
σ2NWi − σ2NMi
2λ
)
. (18)
Applying Kuhn-Tucker conditions [5] to make sure
that Pi > 0, gives us the first condition for power
allocation strategy, which is NWi > NMi. Contin-
uing further and finding the roots of the quadratic
equation, results in the following condition:
Pi =
1
2
√N24 + 2N4λ −N∑
 (19)
where N4 = σ2NWi−σ2NMi and N∑ = σ2NWi+σ2NMi .
Applying Kuhn-Tucker condition again, we get
the second condition for power allocation strategy,
which is, (
1
σ2NMi
− 1
σ2NWi
)
> 2λ. (20)
This theorem suggests that only those channels
for which (σ2NWi − σ2NMi) > 0 need to be allocated
power. If the threshold λ is selected according
to (16), then the power allocation strategy closely
follows the classical waterfilling strategy. The dif-
ference is that in the CSO problem with parallel
AWGN channels, the channels are ranked based on
(σ2NWi − σ2NMi). The CSO needs to communicate
with its agents only on those channels which have an
advantage over eavesdroppers and use the strategy
described in Theorem 1 to invest on its resources.
C. CSO Problem with Fading Downlink Channels
A fading channel between the CSO and any agent
i can be described [10] as
Yi(j) = gMi(j)Xi(j) +NMi(j) (21)
where Xi(j) and Yi(j) are the input and the output
of the ith channel during the time interval j and
NMi(j) represents the noise on the same channel.
This is shown in Fig. 6. Similarly, the eavesdrop-
per’s channel can be modeled as
Zi(j) = gWi(j)Xi(j) +NWi(j) (22)
where Zi(j) represents the output of the eavesdrop-
per’s channel during the interval j, and NWi(j)
denotes noise on the eavesdropper’s channel. The
channel fading on the ith main channel and the ith
eavesdropper’s channel are represented by gMi(j)
and gWi(j) which are zero-mean white Gaus-
sian random variables, i.e. gMi(j) ∼ N(0, σ2gMi(j)),
gWi(j) ∼N(0, σ2gWi(j)). Let us assume that NMi(j)
as well as NWi(j) represent i.i.d. additive Gaussian
noise with unit variance. For simplicity of descrip-
tion, we drop the index (j) for time interval from
here onwards.
We assume that each channel uses unit power for
transmission as in [11], so we can denote the fading
power gains corresponding to the two channels by
ai = σ
2
gMi
and bi = σ2gWi respectively and let
γi = (ai, bi) denote the channel state information
(CSI). Let P (γi) represent the power allocation for
ith channel. The average power (Pˆ ) constraint for
channel i is given by E[P (γi)] ≤ Pˆ .
Lemma 9. In a CSO model with fading downlink
channels, if the channel state information is known,
the secrecy capacity C(i,down,F )s of the i
th downlink
channel between the CSO and agent i is given by:
C(i,down,F )s = max
P (γi):E[P (γi)]=Pˆ
Eγi [C(γi, P (γi)] (23)
where C(γi, P (γi)) = 12 [log(1 + P (γi)ai)− log(1 +
P (γi)bi)].
Proof: The proof for this lemma is based on
the secrecy capacity of independent fading channels
that can be found in [7], [10].
Theorem 2. : In a CSO model with fading downlink
channels, if the channel state information is known
to all parties, the power allocation strategy that
achieves the secrecy capacity described in Lemma
9 satisfies the following constraints [10].
Pi(ai, bi) > 0 if ai > bi (24)
= 0 otherwise
P (ai, bi) =
1
2
√N24 + 2N4λ −N∑

8where N4 = ( 1ai − 1bi ) and N∑ = ( 1ai + 1bi ). The
threshold λ is chosen such that the average power
constraint E[P (γi)] ≤ Pˆ is satisfied.
Proof: The proof for Theorem 2 is similar to
that of Theorem 1 and can be found in [10]. The
interpretation of the result is also similar to that of
Theorem 1. The difference between the two is in
terms of the dynamic nature of the channels. In the
later case, the CSO needs to assess the channels
more frequently to find the channels on which it has
an advantage over the eavesdroppers, and allocate
its resources accordingly.
III. CSO PROBLEM WITH COOPERATING
AGENTS
In this section, we extend the CSO framework to
include cooperation among the agents and investi-
gate the advantages of such cooperation. The intu-
itive idea is that the agents that are not capable of
secret communications with the CSO may help other
agents to enhance the secrecy capacity. For example,
two agents can cooperate with each other to make
one of their channels capable of secret sharing. This
can happen through jamming the eavesdropper just
like the way the defense team attacks the offense
team in football or soccer game.
A. Enhancing Secret Communication Through Co-
operation
Assume that all communication channels in the
CSO model are fading channels as shown in Fig.
6. Among the N fading channels, we define the
channels that satisfy the following condition:
ai
σ2NMi
>
bi
σ2NWi
(25)
as qualified channels (capable of secret communi-
cation with the CSO), where σ2NMi and σ
2
NWi
are
the variances of NMi and NWi. Here, ai and bi are
equal to σ2gMi and σ
2
gWi
respectively. The channels
that do not satisfy condition (25) are considered
disqualified.
In a scenario where agent cooperation is not
allowed, no secret sharing will be possible on
disqualified channels. However, when agents are
allowed to cooperate, they can help one another in
distracting the eavesdroppers through jamming. One
approach to achieve such a cooperation is through
appropriate pairing of agents. Suppose that there
are k number of disqualified channels and they are
ordered according to their SNR values:
a1
σ2NM1
<
a2
σ2NM2
< ...... <
ak
σ2NMk
. (26)
There exist many strategies for pairing the co-
operative nodes. One approach that maximizes the
number of secret communication channels is de-
scribed below: For each channel i ∈ (1, . . . , k),
find the smallest and unused channel s ∈ (i +
1, . . . , k) such that as
σ2NMs
> bi
σ2NWi
. If such s exists,
pair up agent i with agent s. If such s doesn’t exist,
move on to the next channel.
In the best case scenario, every agent will be
successfully paired with another cooperating agent.
This leads to qualifying half of the originally dis-
qualified channels.
The ratio Csq,i
Cq,i
is used as a metric to evaluate the
secrecy efficiency of a qualified channel i, where
Csq,i = log2(1 +
ai
σ2NMi
) − log2(1 + biσ2NWi ) and
Cq,i = log2(1+
ai
σ2NMi
). The denominator Cq,i reflects
the capacity of the channel i in the absence of any
eavesdropper.
When a disqualified channel i is turned into a
qualified channel with the help of a cooperating
agent h, the eavesdropper listening to channel i is
completely jammed by the cooperating agent h pro-
vided ah
σ2NMh
≥ bi
σ2NWi
≥ ai
σ2NMi
. The secrecy efficiency
achieved through the pair of cooperating agents
(i, h) is given by Csp,i
Cp,i
, where Csp,i = log2(1+
ai
σ2NMi
)
and Cp,i = log2(1 +
ai
σ2NMi
) + log2(1 +
ah
σ2NMh
). The
denominator Cp,i denotes the sum of capacities of
the channels corresponding to the two cooperating
agents. Increasing the number of secret communica-
tion channels is equivalent to increasing the overall
secrecy capacity of the CSO uplink channels.
Fig. 7 illustrates the secrecy efficiency achieved
through the proposed cooperation strategy. It shows
a scenario in which there are three qualified chan-
nels and six disqualified channels. Half of the six
disqualified channels are turned into qualified chan-
nels through cooperation. Note that the maximum
secrecy efficiency achieved through cooperation is
0.5.
9IV. SUMMARY
This paper introduced the CSO problem and
investigated two scenarios: one without coopera-
tion and the other with cooperation among agents.
Secrecy capacity and power allocation strategies
are discussed in both contexts. A strategy for en-
hancing secrecy capacity through cooperation is
proposed and its optimality in terms of maximizing
the secrecy capacity has been proved. Experimental
results are provided to illustrate the benefits of the
proposed strategy. Other models of cooperation that
limit the information leaked to eavesdropper’s will
be explored in future.
APPENDIX A
OPTIMALITY OF THE PROPOSED PAIRING
STRATEGY
In this appendix, we show that the proposed
pairing strategy described in Section III-A is op-
timal in terms of maximizing the number of secret
communication channels.
Proof: Let Ai, i ∈ (1, . . . , k) represent the
SNR of the disqualified channel from agent i to
CSO, i.e. Ai = aiσ2NMi
. Let Ei, i ∈ (1, . . . , k)
represent the SNR of the corresponding eavesdrop-
per channel, i.e. Ei = biσ2NWi
. A channel i becomes
disqualified when Ai < Ei. Then, the node pairing
problem is equivalent to choosing a cooperating
node j such that (Aj > Ei > Ai). Then, the node
pairing problem is equivalent to finding as many (i,
j) pairs as possible that satisfy this condition.
Let S(i) denote the set of all nodes that can pair
up with node i and let |S(i)| represent the size
of this set. Assume that Ai’s are sorted from the
smallest to the largest. Since Ak is the largest among
all Ais, |S(k)| = 0. An example consisting of five
agent-eavesdropper pairs is shown in Fig. 8. In this
example, since A5 > A4 > A3 > A2 > E1 > A1,
the set for agent 1 is S(1) = {2, 3, 4, 5}, and
|S(1)| = 4. Also, it is easy to see that S(2) = {4, 5},
S(3) = {4, 5}, S(4) = {5}, S(5) = {φ}, and
|S(2)| = 2, |S(3)| = 2, |S(4)| = 1, |S(5)| = 0.
A reasonable assumption is that each agent is
aware of how strong (channel SNR) his/her cor-
responding eavesdropper is. Further, since agents
cooperate with each other, it is reasonable to assume
that all agents share their eavesdropper’s channel
state information (CSI) with one another. Then,
three different cases arise as discussed below.
Case 1:
E1 ≤ E2 ≤ ...... ≤ Ek
In this case, all agents who can pair up with j can
also pair up with i, for all j > i, since Ej > Ei.
Therefore,
|S(1)| ≥ |S(2)| ≥ ...... ≥ |S(k − 1)|.
If there exists an x, 1 ≤ x ≤ k − 1, such that
|S(x)| = 1, and |S(x− 1)| > 1. This implies that x
can pair up only with one agent which is k. Starting
from agent 1, if all agents before x randomly pick
one cooperating agent from their respective sets,
then the probability (Pr(picking k)) of k being
picked by any one of them resulting in x being not
able to pair up with any agent is given by:
Pr(picking k) = 1− Pr(not picking k)
= 1− C
1
|S(1)|−1
C1|S(1)|
· C
1
|S(2)|−1
C1|S(2)|
· ... · C
1
|S(x−1)|−1
C1|S(x−1)|
= 1− |S(1)|−1|S(1)| · |S(2)|−1|S(2)| · ... · |S(x−1)|−1|S(x−1)| .
This guarantees that Pr(picking k) > 0. On the
other hand, if the proposed pairing strategy is
used, then, all agents before x pick the smallest
i to pair up with from their respective sets, then,
Pr(picking k) = 0. Thus, the proposed pairing
strategy is optimal for case 1, because it guarantees
that agent x can pair up with someone even though
he/she has the least number of options.
Case 2:
E1 > E2 > ...... > Ek
In this case, all agents who can pair up with i can
also pair up with j, for all j > i, since Ej < Ei.
Therefore,
|S(1)| ≤ |S(2)| ≤ ...... ≤ |S(k − 1)|.
In this case, agent i is not affected by the choices
made by others before i, i ∈ (1, . . . , k). Hence, no
pairing strategy is needed. However, if the proposed
pairing strategy used, it achieves the highest secrecy
efficiency. For example, assume the set for agent
m is S(m) = {l, l + 1, ..., k}, where Am < Al <
Al+1 < ... < Ak. If a node d is randomly selected
from S(m) to pair up with m, then Ad ≥ Al and
the secrecy efficiency is Am
Am+Ad
. If the smallest agent
is selected from S(m) using the proposed strategy,
then the secrecy efficiency is Am
Am+Al
. Since Ad ≥ Al,
Am
Am+Ad
≤ Am
Am+Al
. Therefore, the proposed pairing
10
strategy is optimal for case 2, because it achieves
the highest secrecy efficiency.
Case 3: There is no particular order of Eis.
This is a random combination of case 1 and case
2. Therefore, the proposed pairing strategy is an
optimal in this case also.
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Chief Security Officer
Agent (1) Agent (2) Agent (N)
……………
X1 X2 XN
Y1 Y2 YN
Z 2
……
Wiretapper(s)
Z 1 Z N……
Fig. 1: The CSO framework models the secret
information exchange between the CSO and the
agents.
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P(y|x)X
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Fig. 2: Alice-Bob-Eve secrecy channel
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Fig. 3: CSO downlink broadcast channel (BC) with
two agents
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P(y|x1, x2) 
(MAC) 
Yn 
X1n 
Zn 
P(z|x) 
Bob (2) 
X2n 
Alice  
(CSO) 
Fig. 4: CSO uplink multiple access channel (MAC)
with two agents
Chief Security Officer
Agent (1) Agent (2) Agent (N) Wiretapper(s)
Σ Σ Σ Σ
……………
X [1,..,N]
NM1 NM2 NMN NW[1,..,N]
X1 X2 XN
Y1 Y2 YN
Z [1,..,N]
Fig. 5: The CSO problem with AWGN downlink
channels.
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Fig. 6: The CSO problem with fading downlink
channels.
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Fig. 7: Using cooperation among agents to increase
the secrecy capacity of CSO fading downlink chan-
nel. The three plots corresponding to the qualified
channels reflect the effect of eavesdroppers with
low, medium, and strong channel SNRs. The three
plots corresponding to the cooperating pairs reflect
the effect of cooperation from agents with low,
medium, and strong channel SNRs.
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1 2 3 4 5
C
h
an
n
e
l S
N
R
Agents and corresponding eavesdroppers
Ai
Ei
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and its corresponding eavesdropper
